Vietnam Lowers Gold's Cashless Threshold as Jewellery Rules Ease

A recent policy change—not a new October 26 announcement

The government issued Decree 390/2026/ND-CP on October 16, 2026, with effect from that date. The October 22 government explanation and the signed decree establish the policy, rather than a search headline or an unverified report of a gold ban.

This October 26 explainer examines how the package changes the route between buyers, sellers and the physical market. It is separate from the U.S. rate relief and laboratory-made-gold supply questions covered in InGold's October 24 articles.

The daily cashless threshold falls from VND20 million to VND5 million

The amended payment provision covers a customer's gold purchases and sales with a daily value of VND5 million or more. Settlement must use non-cash payment instruments in accordance with the applicable non-cash-payment law. The threshold includes VND5 million; it is not restricted to transactions above that amount.

The earlier rule introduced under Decree 232/2025/ND-CP used VND20 million per customer per day and specified payment through customer and gold-business accounts at banks. The new numerical threshold is 75% lower. That is a change in the payment trigger, not a claim that gold demand or transaction values have fallen 75%.

The daily-customer framing matters: it should not be rewritten as a separate VND5 million allowance for every receipt. The decree's general cashless requirement also should not be presented as a universal list of approved wallets or as proof that every trader uses identical operating procedures.

Jewellery-business entry becomes less restrictive

The package takes gold jewellery and art-gold production, processing and trading out of the special conditional-business category. Its transitional provisions state that the State Bank's previous jewellery-production eligibility certificate is no longer a prerequisite for that activity.

This is not the removal of all oversight. The amended text expressly retains obligations covering product quality, standards, measurement, labelling, price display, invoices, tax, safety, environmental protection, consumer rights and anti-money-laundering rules.

The distinction from bullion bars is equally important. Gold-bar production and trading remain conditional activities subject to State Bank licensing. Easier entry into jewellery activity does not by itself authorize unrestricted bullion-bar manufacturing or imports.

The valuation channel is access and competition

Our interpretation has two potentially opposing channels. A lower cashless threshold brings smaller purchases into formal payment arrangements. Customers who rely on cash or lack a suitable payment route could face more friction; customers already comfortable with digital settlement might experience little additional difficulty.

Separately, removing a jewellery-specific entry condition could lower an administrative barrier for producers and traders. If that translates into actual entry and effective competition, it could affect retail services, costs or margins. None of those outcomes is automatic, and compliance with the remaining rules still matters.

These mechanisms concern how demand reaches the market, not whether the desire to own gold has disappeared. A payment restriction can change timing or channels without proving a fall in underlying ownership demand; a simpler entry rule can encourage competition without guaranteeing cheaper metal.

Do not turn local policy into a global shortage or demand forecast

A domestic gold price or premium reflects local buying, replenishment, product characteristics and trading costs as well as the international benchmark. Payment access and business-entry rules can influence that local layer, but this decree alone cannot identify the direction or size of the price effect.

This brief has not established a current Vietnamese transaction-volume series, a before-and-after premium comparison or a quantified change in imports caused by the decree. It therefore makes no numerical claim about lost demand, a surge in buying, or a resulting move in the global gold price.

Nor is this a new central-bank gold-purchase disclosure or a mine-supply shock. U.S. real yields remain relevant to bullion's broader opportunity cost, but repeating that already-covered monetary story would miss the distinct evidence here: a documented change in the rules of physical-market participation.

What would demonstrate a market impact?

The useful next observations are changes in participation, settlement experience and competition after implementation. Those should be assessed alongside dated volumes and like-for-like local premiums, with care not to attribute every change to this one policy package.

For now, the verified conclusion is narrower and more useful than a ban narrative: Vietnam is expanding cashless settlement while easing a jewellery-business entry condition. Whether those changes ultimately constrain some purchases, formalize existing trade or improve competition remains an evidence question.

• Whether buyers and sellers can use compliant payment methods without material delays or exclusion.
• Whether jewellery-business entry and competition actually increase after the eligibility change.
• Whether comparable local premiums and transaction volumes shift persistently, rather than for one session.
• Whether subsequent State Bank guidance clarifies implementation without being confused with individual traders' policies.